University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

6-17-1967

The UN, the Middle East and Vietnam
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "The UN, the Middle East and Vietnam" (1967). Mike Mansfield Speeches,
Statements and Interviews. 655.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/655

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

July 11, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yesterday a thoughtful, considered speech
was made by our colleague, the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr.
CASE]. The subject was Vietnam. One
does not have to agree with every
thought contained in that speech to recognize it as constructive and helpful. It
showed a facing up to the realities in
the situation in that unhappy country.
It was the work of a concerned, responsible American carrying out his responsibilities as an elected Member of the
Senate. It was an expression of an effort
to be helpful to our country by advancing ways and means which might provide a way around the impasse in which
we find ourselves in Vietnam.
Our distinguished colleague from New
Jersey [Mr. CASE] is to be commended
for the sense of sober responsibility
which he has shown. I would hope that
what I have to say will be useful in the
same sense.
The most difficult subject to talk on
today is the question of Vietnam. Regardless of how one feels about It, it is
an issue which is in the mind of everyone. It is an issue which overshadows all
else.
For several weeks, events in the Middle East have held the attention of this
Nation and the United Nations. It is not
surprising that interest in the situation
there is high. What transpires at the
crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa
has long been of many-sided concern to
the world.
It is time to note, however, that for
the most part the guns are silent in
Sinai and along the other frontiers of
Israel. All the while, though, they continue to shatter the stillness at the 17th
parallel in Vietnam. Even as the last of
the fallen from the recent desert war are
counted. the dead continue to pile up in
Vietnam. If the plight of the refugees
from less than a week of conflict in the
Middle East weighs heavily on the human
conscience, what is to be said of the immense accumulation of the uprooted and
homeless after years of war in Vietnam?
It does not minimize the recent clash
in the Middle East to point out that a
reasonably effective cease-fire has been
achieved and the central concern is now
the design of a peace which will inhibit
another outbreak of war. That is a far
cry from the situation in Vietnam. In
that tortured nation, the beginnings of
the beginning of peace are not yet in
sight. There is not even a glimmer of
the end.
To be sure there is a continuing danger of a third world war emerging from
the local war in the Middle East. The
birth of a conftict among the great powers will remain a possibility in the absence of a durable settlement among the
small powers of that region. Who will
say, however, that a third world war is
not already incubating in the everdeepening and expanding struggle in
Southeast Asia?
It seems to me that whatever the angle
from which these two situations are
viewed, Vietnam remains the most serious disruption in the well-being of this
Nation and it constitutes for the United

Nations, the most urgent threat of a
third world war. That appears to me to
be the reality and it would be well to
keep in touch with it.
The need is especially acute at this
time when, once again, we are apparently
approaching a fork in the road in Vietnam. The harbingers of significant decision have emerged in the form of obscure "official" rumblings, rumors, and
revelations concerning Vietnam. The
search, it is said, is being renewed for
a "more effective and extensive" use of
airpower agains·; North Vietnam which,
may I say, is probably another way of
asking why Hanoi and Haiphong are not
bombed into extinction. There is talk of
again lifting the American manpower
commitment in Vietnam-not much, it
is said, just another 100,000 or 2 in the
next few months--to add to the more
than half million or more men presently
engaged in and around Southeast Asia.
Ironically, this talk of the need for more
men comes at a time when it is revealed
that only one-sixth or one-seventh of
the U.S. troops already in Vietnam are
actually involved in combat.
The inference of these rumblings,
rumors, and revelations is that one further step in military escalat.ion will carry
us over the top. The implication is that
one additional reach of American military power deeper into Southeast Asia
will bring the sun of final victory out
from behind the restraining clouds.
And once again, Mr. President, the
Secretary of Defense has gone to Saigon
to make a firsthand evaluation of the
situation. According to the press he has
heard and accepted the most encouraging reports of "progress" toward our
"objectives" in Vietnam. While I do not
in any sense question the accuracy or the
objectivity of the evaluations which he
has received, it must be asked in all
frankness what is meant by "progress"
toward our "objectives" in the context of
the present situation in Vietnam? In all
frankness, it must be said that these generalizations of progress would be more
reassuring if they had not been heard
from American leaders in Vietnam at
many other times, stretching years into
the past. Indeed, I know of no American
leader, military or civilian, in Vietnam
during the past decade or more who has
contended that we were doing anything
else except making "progress" toward
our "objectives."
The fact is that reports of progress are
strewn, like burned out tanks, all along
the road which has led this Nation ever
more deeply into Vietnam and southeast
Asia during the past decade and a half.
They were pres·~nt when the sole function of American military personnel in
Vietnam was that of aid suppliers to the
French-commanded Vietnamese loyalist
forces. They were present when our military functions in Vietnam evolved into
that of trainers and advisers of the South
Vietnamese forces, to that of air transporters and supparters, to that of combat
bulwarks and, finally, to that of combat
substitutes for the South Vietnamese
forces.
The generalization on progress, in
short, is the ever-present beat which is
to be heard throughout the transition of
the American military role from the most
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remote and invisiblr rear to the most forward and conspicuous front of the Vietnamese war. It has been pn'sent, this
promise of progress. as the casuallies in
our forces in dead and wounded have increased from less than 10 a year, to 10 a
month, to 10 a week, to 10 a day, to 10 an
hour of every hour of every day. It has
been present as the estimated expenditures of the Federal Government for
Vietnam have increased from a few hundred million a year, to $2 billion, to $12
billion, to the current level of probably
not less than $25 billion a year.
May I say that I have remarked on
these overlooked and negative aspects
of the Vietnamese situation, not In criticism of our leaders in Vietnam or of the
Secretary of Defense, or the President.
These men have carried the immense responsibilities of the war with integrity
and personal dedication. I have raised
them. rather, in the hope of introducing
a measure of historic perspective into the
consideration of the question of Vietnam
as we approach, apparently, another
point of significant decision. And may
I add that there are othrr aspects of the
question which should be raised in order
that the problem of Vietnam may be also
seen in the full scope of its worldwide
ramifications.
Yes, Mr. President, we can put anqther
100,000 men into Vietnam or, I sup·Jose,
200,000 or even more; there are a 1)t of
young Americans. even though the supply is not unlimited. Yes, we can mine
the harbor of Haiphong as we have already mined the rivers of North Vietnam; we have most effective mines and
the best sowing techniques. Yes, we can
level the city of Hanoi as we have leveled
its pawer plants; we have the ordnance,
as the circumlocution for bombs now
puts it.
It is to be hoped, however, that before
we embark on this course of expansion
toward total war in Vietnam, we will
pause for a long and sober think. Before
we take another significant step deeper
into Vietnam, it is to be hoped that we
will have asked ourselves at what point
we intend to increase taxes, apply the
wage and price controls, tighten the draft
exemptions, call up the Reserves, and
make the countless other adjustments
in our national life which are implicit in
further extensions of the American
involvement.
It is to be hoped that we will have
asked ourselves. too, Mr. President. at
what point in this ever-increasing infusion of American men and power into
South Vietnam we reduce the present
Vietnamese politico-military structure
which is based on Saigon to a final
irrelevancy.
It is to be hoped that we will have
asked ourselves what indiscriminate
bombing in North Vietnam may have in
common with any objectives of the
United States anywhere in Vietnam or
Southeast Asia. It is to be hoped that
we will have asked ourselves what interests of the Vietnamese people-in whose
interests we were prompted to go into
Vietnam in the first place-will be served
by the bombing of combatant and noncombatant, in Hanoi and Haiphong?
And it is to be hoped that we \vill
have asked ourselves about the next step
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beyond the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong if that, too, should fail, as every
other escalation to date has failed to
bring this conflict to a conclusion.
We have the power, Mr. President, to
bomb the Vietnamese back into the Stone
Age. And 11 that 'pOwer is tmsheathed
once in error, we had better be prepared
to move back into the caves. along with
the Vietnamese, and the rest of the
world.
It is to be hoped that before pltmging
deeper we will have asked ourselves at
what point that which began as limited
U.S. aid to the South Vietnamese military becomes wholly an American war
against all Vietnam, becomes a war in
Korea. becomes a war in the Formosan
Straits, becomes a war with China. And
while we are asking we had better ask
ourselves, finally, at what point in this
ever-widening compass of conflict--at
what point along the road to World War
ill-the Sino-Soviet breach is finally
healed? And, thereafter, at what point a
new eruption occurs at Berlin or some
other pressure 'pOint of potential universal conflict?
These are questions. Mr. President,
which ,General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker are not equipped and
ought not to be required to answer from
Vietnam. They are questions which Secretary McNamara ought not to be expected to a nswer on the basis of a visit to
Saigon. Yet, they are questions of great
relevance, along with reports of "progress" toward our "objectives." in any decisions involving Vietnam. They are questions for all of us.
Quite apart from the answers, may I
say, the very pertinence of the questions
suggests to me the need for the greatest
r estraint in any further increases in the
American involvement in South VietnRm
or in any expansion of that conflict beyond its present geographic dimensions.
Indeed, the very pertinence of these
questions urges a renewed effort to reduce the present level of American Involvement. In this connection, I would
refer once again to the recent proposal
of the Senator from K entucky fMr.
COOPER] to limit bombing in the north
to areas of immediate relevance to the Infiltration of supplies and men across the
17th parallel into the south. I would refer once again to the proposal to concentrate a military eiTort on the construction of a defensive barrier just south of
the demilitarized zone at the 17Lh parallel across Laos to the border of Thailand
which can be held by South Vietnamese
forces. And I would refer once again to
the suggestion that this Nation move to
have the U.N. Security Council regard
the situation in Vietnam at least with
the equivalent concern which it shows
for the Middle East. We owe it to the
Americans whom we have sent to Vietnam, to ourselves. to the Vietnamese,
and to the world. to try to bring about
a face-to-face confrontation of all involved in Vietnam .at the U.N. Security
Council.
We need to continue this initiative.
based on the U.S. resolution before the
U.N. Security Council since January 1966,
so that the world may know what kind
of peace is sought and by whom. We
need to continue this initiative in order

SENATE

that no stone may be left unturned in
the effort to bring about a cease-fire and
honorable settlement of this ugly war.
We cannot and should not withdraw.
We should not and, I hope, will not enlarge the war in Vietnam against the
north. The most important question
which confronts this Nation at this point
Is hot the Middle East. It is not domestic
policies. It is the situation in Vietnam.
That will continue to be the case and all
else will be subordinate until this conflict
can be ended in a fashion which preserves
the integrity of political choice of the
people of South Vietnam.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President. I have listened very carefully, but without any
great degree of optimism, to the remarks
of the majority leader of the Senate.
It is unfortunate, Mr. President, that
the advice of the majority leader has not
been accepted by the administration to
the same degree as the advice of certain
military leaders who have far more
knowledge of weapons than they have
of people.
I have no particular use for Monday
morning quarterbacks, although I recogruze there is a great opportunity for
their talents in consideration of the situation in Vietnam. I am getting letters
now from people who once thought that a
short foray into North Vietnam by our
planes would bring the war to an early
close. Their excuse for not winning the
war 1s that it has not been wide enough,
It has not been intense enough, and now
hey go so far as to say we should, if
nece~sary, destroy all of North Vietnam's
rcsom·ces. What they apparently mean
IS thn.t we should use the atom bomb.
I do not know whether they have
thought through well enough the effect
of such action; whether they have considered that our position In history, 1f
we used the atom bomb in North Vietnam, would be more glorious or not, assum,ng that history is permitted to continue--and it can be drstroycd. But I do
hope that they are considering the cost.
When you talk of dollars and cents, they
really understand that.
I suppose Secretary McNamara will be
back very shortly from his trip to South
Vietnam. I expect that hr w11l recommend intenslflcatlon and probably some
increase in armed ~en·ices personnel In
that part of the world. But before expanding-whether he recommends expansion or not--we should consider
whether we are willing to pay the cost.
Senator MANSFIELD and I were told by
the highest military authorities what we
have in Vietnam, that it takes 10 rl'gulars
to cope with one guerrilla. I do not know
how much of the oppo~ition over there
is in organized units and how much is in
the form of guerrilla.~. I think It is safe
to say thPre are 50.000 or 100.000 who
would qualify as gueiTillas ~<till operating in Yietnam. Multiply that by 10 and
you find that no insi~nificant numbPr of
our forces can cope with thPm. Even half
a million cannot cope with them. Probably a million might be able to control
the situation and rcstorr a sC'mblance of
ordC'r in South Vietnam Itself.
We hear that the administration now
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says we must have a tax increase to meet
these additional costs. They have already
moved arotmd figures relating to the fi nancial condition of our Government until they really cannot move any further
without a tax increase. They talk about
a 6-percent increase. More recently we
heard it m ight go to 10 percent. P eople
who know Government financing say it
will require an 18- to 20-percent surtax
on the income taxes of t his country to
meet the additional costs which have
been incurred over in Sout heastern Asia.
I would like to ask these people who
are so free with their advice as to what
we should do over there, and who
suggest exterminating North Vietnam,
whether they would be willing to impose
the additional taxes needed, w~ether
they would be willing to remove their
own tax benefits. particularly those who
are making untold millions of dollars out
of furnishing supplies and operations for
our wars. Are they willing to have wage
and price controls imposed, which, if we
are to have an increase in the war effort,
must come?
They talk about inflation, about only
a 2- to 3-percent Inflation over the past
year or so. or mayb~ 3 or 4 percent. The
inflation has come in the things which
the people have to have, and the only
reason why the percentage is held down
is that included in that estimate of the
inflationary galn--or Joss, I would call
it--are all the things they do not have to
have. But if you are sick today, if you
have a child needing an education, if you
need a home, you will find the cost has
gone up 20 percent, rather than 2 percent. the last year or so.
I have no advice to give the adminIstration. Tltey would not take it if I
gave it. So what is the use of wasting my
breath?
I do not think it was a smart move
that we made in Africa. I was very much
interested that on this floor statements
were made In which they got good advice
from people far better advised in military tactics than I am. I hope they will
use reason.
I would like to see someone in our
Government admit making a mistake. It
would make him a big person. I have
often thought that anyone in a high position in Government ought to make one
mist,ake so he can admit it and gain or
regain the respect of the people.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Ve1mont for his frankness as well as his
kind remarks.
May I express the hope that we will
continue to ask ourselves questions. be
aware of the potentials and the possibili ties involved in that area of the world,
and compare them with our own vital interests.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President. will
the Sen a tor yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to
YiC'ld to the distinguished Srnat,or from
Missouri.
Mr. Pre~ldent, I a_<;k unanimous consent that we may proceed for an additional 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING Ol''FICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
respectfully commend the able senior
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Senator from Montana, our majority
leader, for his thought-provoking talk
this morning. With most of It I agree;
with some I do not .
It Is unfortunate to hear the casual
way people often discuss indiscriminate
bombing. The concept of air power, as
recommended, 1s against meaningful
military targets only, and does not involve destruction of towns. The basic
idea behind those who believe in Air
Force and naval air is that the more artillery and guns destroyed by the Air
Force and the Navy in North Vietnam,
the fewer Americans will be killed In
South Vietnam.
I was,saddened to hear the Senator
from Vermont, in discussing this matter a few moments ago, talk about the
fact people who do not believe in tw-ning
this entire war over to ground forces
could be people who want to drop the
atom bomb in Vietnam. I have heard no
military man, at any time, recommend
the dropping of the atom bomb in this
Vietnamese war.
What we are becoming steadily more
involved in today Is a major ground war
In Asia. If we would utilize--on military
targets only--our airpower and seapower, we would have far better results
than we are having, or would have If we
turned the entire war over to ground
forces.
Nobody has greater respect for the
Army and Marine Corps than I . On the
other hand, it has been proved by the
history of past wars that have been successful-far more successful than any
results we have achieved to date in Vietnam-that a team of land, sea, and air
1s far more effective in modern engagement than employing ground forces
alone.
Let those who apparently have no
faith in ai.rpower, used only on mi.litary
targets, bear with me in the telling of
just one story.
In December 1965, at a U.S. base, a
bird colonel said to me, "I am a Regular,
proud to fight for my country. But I
don't see why I do it under all these
restrictions. Several times a week I fty in
a multim1llion-dollar airplane, in order
to bomb an empty barracks or an empty
bus."

One year later, I was back at that same
base, and asked, "How is my friend Colonel Nelson? Has he gone home, or is he
still here?"
The reply was, "No, he got his on his
77th mission, attacking one truck."
It is unfortunate that some people do
not realize, if you attack, say, a powerplant in North Vietnam, the casualties
to the North Vietnamese would be very
few-probably not more than a half
dozen people.
Anyone who understands a powerplant
operation knows that to be true. But the
attack might save many American lives
in South Vietnam.
On the other hand, for a great many
months, pilots of the Navy and Air Force
have been allowed to conduct armed reconnaissance. They can go up a road
where a bus 1s moving and destroy it.
They have no idea, of course, whether in
that bus are soldiers or schoolchildren.
Rules and regulations governing the
action of a single pilot in a single-engine

airplane have run as lonr:: as seven pages
listing what he cannot do. The whole
concept of the proper utilization of airpower and seapower, at Limes, I am sure,
Inadvertently, is being misstated and becoming misty. we ·are getting away from
any team concept of land, sea, and air,
and asking the ground forces 1;o do it all.
Mr. President, as stated before, no one
has greater respect for the Army and
Ma rine Corps than I , but even if we had
a million men in South Vietnam, instead
of the half million we approximate. today, we would get no further than we
have pursuing these unfortunate policies.
The trouble is not in North Vietnam;
the trouble Is prima1ily with the people
in South Vietnam.
Therefore, Mr. President, I hope we do
not make this war from here out only a
maj or ground war on the mainland of
Asia, which the great military-such as
Marshall and MacArthur-have warned
against during all this century. It would
be far more logical with that premise, to
turn it all over to the South Vietnamese
Army, not the U.S. Army. But what I do
not understand is why anybody would
think the poor South Vietnamese would
fight any better behind this proposed
Maginot line below the demilitarized
zone than they have in the rest of their
country.
Why not face It? From here out it is
the American forces that must do a
steadily increasing amount of the fightIng if the present South Vietnam Government Is to survive.
I thank my beloved friend, the majority
leader, for yielding.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Missouri for his frank remarks, to which
I have listened with interest. It is evident that there are some matters upon
which we disagree, but th3-t is one of the
strengths of a democracy, and one of the
strengths of the Senate, as I see it, as
an institution.
I may some day go into further detail
about this barrier below the 17th parallel, because I certainly am in disagreement, to put it mildly, with the thesis
advanced by the Senator from Missouri
this morning. But it gives us something
to think about.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
would only say that perhaps there are
things about this proposed barrier which
the Senator from Montana knows that
I do not know.
For 15 years I have been a member of
the Committee on Armed Services; and
for many years a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. There has been
no testimony before either committee
with respect to any such "barrier." All
I know about it is what I read in the
newspapers. One gets a bit tired of obtaining military Information from the
newspapers instead of even in executive
sessions with the proper persons from the
Department of Defense and State as
witnesses.
I know the able majority leader agrees
with me on that, and am glad that on
many other subjects, such as reduction
of our troops in Europe, we are together.
It is always a privilege to be together
with him in any matter.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to the

Senator from Missouri that my information comes only from the public
prints; I have no inside "dope."
ONE MAN, ONE VOTE NEEDED FOR
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President. especially
since the Senate began to consider legislation affecting congressional redistricting, there has been an outpouring of
popular sentiment in support of the principle that each man's vote should count
as much as the next man's ln elections
of U.S. Representatives.
The Federal Constitution, good judgment and equity require that any Federal legislation affecting congressional
redistricting should strengthen rather
than impede the enforcement of this
important principle.
Two recent editorials, one published
in the New York Times, the other in the
Knoxville News-Sentinel, have been particularly timely and thoughtful.
The Times editorial, published today,
makes the important point that the Senate's strict prohibition against the discredited practice of gerrymandering is
an essential part of the Senate version
of the bill and should be retained in the
conference report. I thoroughly agree.
The editorial in the News-Sentinel develops in more detail how malapportionment and gerrymandering have in the
past denied many American citizens fair
representation in the U.S. Congress.
I ask unanimous consent that both of
these excellent editorials be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the R ~CORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, July 11, 19671
BAN THE GERRYMANDER

Any compromise on the Congreslona l redistricting blll reached by· the House-Sena te
conference committee should retain the provision against gerrymandering contained in
the original measure passed by the upper
house. Senator Ervin's reported desire to
knock It out a nd leave this aspect of the
problem to the discretion of the states Is in
effect an invitation to continue an old and
dishonored prac tice.
The blll will be bad enough If It permits a
20 to 30 per cent variation between the
smallest and largest districts In a state until
the election of 1972, but It will be far wor"e
II It omits the Senate requirement that dis tricts be compact. Gerrymandering Is a n o torious, discredited device to perpetuate the
party In power; and It wlll be a disgrace If
Congress now sanctions 1t by silence.
[From the Knoxville (News-Sentinel ),
June 11, 1967]
CORRECTION BY THE SENATE

Under a principle established by the Supreme Court In recent years, the voters are
entitled to representation in both houses of
their legislatures on a "one-mnn-one-vote"
basis.
There is good ground for dissent from this
ruling, especially on the question of the state
voters having a right to choose their own
system.
But there Is no ground for deviation from
this rule when It comes to electing members
of the United States House of Representatives. Under the Constitution. the House is
to be chosen on a population basis.
In the past gerrymandering and neglect
consistently have violated this principle. In
Oklahoma, !or Instance, the population o!

